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DÁVID BITTER
Central European University
IS LOW-LEVEL VISUAL EXPERIENCE
COGNITIVELY PENETRABLE?
A Critical Analysis of Some of the Purported Best Evidence
ABSTRACT: Philosophers and psychologists alike have argued
recently that relatively abstract beliefs or cognitive categories like
those regarding race can influence the perceptual experience of
relatively low-level visual features like color or lightness. Some
of the proposed best empirical evidence for this claim comes from
a series of experiments in which White faces were consistently
judged as lighter than equiluminant Black faces, even for racially
ambiguous faces that were labeled ‘White’ as opposed to ‘Black’
(Levin and Banaji 2006). The latter result is considered especially
indicative of cognitive penetration, based on the reasoning that
the relevant distortions were a function of lexical labeling, and
hence the effect must have been mediated by categorization at
the cognitive level. I argue that this reasoning is flawed, and that
the assumptions on which it relies are questionable on both empir-
ical and theoretical grounds. I propose an alternative, low-level
explanation of the phenomena, which I argue is empirically more
plausible and abductively preferable to the cognitive-penetration
account. The upshot is that cognitively impenetrable perceptual
systems may be psychologically more plastic and hence philosoph-
ically more significant than is nowadays commonly assumed.
Philosophers and psychologists alike have argued recently that the
perceptual experience of relatively low-level visual features like color or
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lightness is susceptible to the influence of relatively abstract beliefs or
concepts such as those regarding race (Collins & Olson 2014; Hugen-
berg & Sacco 2008; Levin & Banaji 2006; Macpherson 2012; Stokes
2013; Vetter & Newen 2014). This is a bold claim, for if visual experi-
ence is thus cognitively penetrable, then quite possibly any or at least
most perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable. In turn, this has
potentially important implications for issues in philosophy such as the
justificatory role of perception (epistemology), the theory-dependence
of observation (philosophy of science), or the continuity of perception
with cognition (philosophy of mind). So whether or to what extent the
above claim is warranted has great importance and relevance.
The central thesis of this paper is that there is in fact no good reason
to assume that low-level visual experience is cognitively penetrable. I
do not claim outright that such effects are empirically impossible. But
I argue that some of the alleged best evidence indeed falls short of pro-
viding sufficient support for an argument for cognitive penetration. It
bears emphasis that the evidence to be discussed is widely considered
to constitute the most convincing case yet for the influence of high-level
cognition on low-level perception. So, if my argumentation is correct,
the burden is on defenders of cognitive penetration to argue why any-
one should still assume that the posited kind of penetration actually
occurs.
The outline of the paper is as follows. I first introduce the notion of
cognitive penetration that is of current interest (Section 1), after which
I summarize a series of psychological experiments that many see as a
best-case example of cognitive penetration into color or lightness expe-
rience (Section 2). I then examine a relatively recent and prima facie
powerful argument that draws on the results of these experiments. I
argue that none of the premises of this argument are warranted, and
hence there is plenty of room to resist the conclusion that low-level vi-
sual experience is cognitively penetrable (Section 3). I subsequently
propose an alternative positive account of the evidence in terms of
purely perceptual mechanisms (Section 4). The upshot is that cogni-
tively impenetrable perceptual systems may be psychologically more
plastic and hence philosophically more significant than is nowadays
commonly assumed. I thus conclude by mentioning some important
implications of the proposed account (Section 5).
Vol. 9: Perception and Concepts
3 Dávid Bitter
1. COGNITIVE PENETRATION
Is our perception of the world influenced by how we think about the
world? On the face of it, the answer would seem to be yes. For example,
there is the story of the desert nomad whose desire for water leads
to his hallucinating a source of water where there is none. Or what
about the amputee whose refusal to accept the loss of a limb results
in her experiencing pain in a body part that doesn’t exist? The list of
candidate examples is long. Accordingly, it might seem evident that our
perceptual experience is cognitively penetrated through and through.
On closer scrutiny, though, the situation is not so simple. For exam-
ple, mirages are real optical phenomena caused by atmospheric con-
ditions. People tend to see water in a desert where there is none be-
cause light from the sky is refracted by hot air above the desert surface,
thereby producing an apparent image as of a sheet of water on the
ground. So the source of this image is not cognitive. Hence, mirages
are not good examples of cognitive penetration.
Neither is the source of phantom limb pain cognitive. True, illusory
visual feedback of a phantom hand caused by the mirror reflection of
an amputee’s normal hand can lead to an alleviation of phantom pain
(Ramachandran et al. 1995). But this effect is presumably a function
of somatosensory-motor coupling between the normal hand and the
phantom hand, which in turn is plausibly explained by cognitively un-
mediated Hebbian (associative) learning. So phantom limb pain is not
a convincing case of cognitive penetration, either.
Of course, there are perceptual effects the source of which is cog-
nitive. But in many cases, the relation between the source cognitive
state and the influenced perceptual state does not seem to be of the
right kind. For example, perceptual effects mediated by changes in the
stimuli (e.g., turning off the lights), the state of the sense organs (e.g.,
closing one’s eyes), or the allocation of (spatial or object-based) atten-
tion are widely disregarded as genuine cases of cognitive penetration.
In these cases, a cognitive source seems neither necessary, nor sufficient
for the relevant effects to occur. On the other hand, the changes in the
stimuli, the state of the sense organ, or the allocation of attention seem
both necessary and sufficient. Accordingly, once such factors are fixed,
many candidate phenomena (e.g., the perceptual switching of ambigu-
ous pictures like the Necker cube) turn out not to be cases of cognitive
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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penetration (Pylyshyn 1999; Raftopoulos 2001).1
A further issue is that many perceptual effects aren’t arbitrarily sen-
sitive to the contents of cognition. For example, selective attention
might alter the impedance of the ear or the aperture of the eye. Yet
such influences typically only affect the amplitude of a transducer’s re-
sponse, rather than the stimulus property to which its response is spe-
cific (Fodor & Pylyshyn 1981). Accordingly, it is traditionally considered
a further condition of cognitive penetration that the effect must sustain
some semantic coherence or logical relation between the contents of
perception and the contents of cognition (Macpherson 2012; Pylyshyn
1999).
Contrary to its prima facie plausibility, then, it is in fact hard to find
a convincing empirical example of cognitive penetration, if by the term
we mean:
(CogPen) A phenomenally conscious experience is cognitively
penetrated =d f
(i) the effect is genuinely perceptual;
(ii) the source of the effect is genuinely cognitive;
(iii) the effect is not mediated by changes in the stimuli,
the state of the sense organs, or the allocation of at-
tention;
(iv) the effect sustains some semantic coherence or logical
relation between the contents of the penetrating cog-
nitive state and the penetrated perceptual state.
It is against this backdrop that a particular set of psychological ex-
periments has been singled out recently as providing possibly the most
convincing case yet for cognitive penetration. In these experiments,
subjects consistently judged images of prototypical White faces as lighter
than equiluminant images of prototypical Black faces. Importantly, sub-
jects also judged an image of a racially ambiguous face as lighter when
it was labeled ‘White’ as opposed to ‘Black’ (Levin & Banaji 2006). It is
especially on account of the latter result that these findings have been
widely interpreted as demonstrating that even relatively abstract be-
liefs or concepts like those regarding race can influence our perceptual
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experience of color or lightness (e.g., Hugenberg & Sacco 2008; Levin
& Banaji 2006; Macpherson 2012; Stokes 2013; Vetter & Newen 2014).
If this claim is true, then it has enormous consequences for the de-
bate on cognitive penetration, as well as for various issues in philoso-
phy. So it is crucial to establish whether the experiments support such
a claim. I argue that they do not. As a first step, let us then acquaint
ourselves with the experiments in question.
2. THE EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
In a set of four experiments Levin and Banaji (2006) tested whether
images of faces categorized as White are perceived as lighter than equi-
luminant images of faces categorized as Black.
2.1. First Experiment: Judged Lightness of Prototypical White/Black Faces
In the first experiment, subjects completed a series of trials in which
they were presented a pair of computer-morphed grayscale images of
prototypical White or Black faces. The faces could be either of the same
race or different races. Within each trial, the initial luminance of the
images was offset. The task was to adjust the luminance of one image
to match the luminance of the other image.
As expected, subjects adjusted images to objectively lighter/darker
levels when matching for White/Black faces. The effect was significant
for all combinations of faces, but it was greater in the different-race
trials than in the same-race trials.
2.2. Second Experiment: Judged Lightness of Racially Ambiguous Faces
In the second experiment, subjects were divided into two groups. Dur-
ing instructions, one group was presented an image of a computer-
morphed grayscale image of a racially ambiguous face labeled ‘White,’
next to an image of an equiluminant prototypical Black face labeled
‘Black’ (‘White’ ambiguous / unambiguous Black). The other group was
presented the same ambiguous face but labeled ‘Black,’ next to an im-
age of an equiluminant prototypical White face labeled ‘White’ (‘Black’
ambiguous / unambiguous White).
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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In the trials, subjects were presented one image at a time without
labels, next to an adjustable gray patch. The initial luminance of the
patch was offset. The task was to adjust the luminance of the patch to
match the luminance of the presented face.
Consonant with previous findings, subjects adjusted the gray patch
to an objectively lighter level for White as opposed to Black faces. Im-
portantly, this was also the case for ‘White’ as opposed to ‘Black’ am-
biguous faces. The magnitude of the effect was even greater than in
the previous experiment.
2.3. Third Experiment: Judged Lightness of Line-Drawing Faces
In the third experiment, the stimuli of the previous experiment were
changed for evenly gray-filled dark and light line drawings of a Black,
White, and ambiguous faces, respectively. Procedures were similar to
those of the previous experiment.2
Cohering with previous findings, subjects adjusted a gray patch to
an objectively lighter level for White as opposed to Black faces. This
was also the case for ambiguous faces initially presented next to a Black
as opposed to a White face. Though the magnitude of the effect was
smaller than for computer-morphed images, importantly, both the mag-
nitude and direction of the effect were similar for dark and light line
drawings.
2.4. Fourth Experiment: Differentiation of Face Pairs by Race
In the fourth experiment, akin to the first experiment, subjects were
presented a pair of computer-morphed images of prototypical White or
Black faces of either the same or different races. Subjects were told
that the faces would vary in luminance, but they were instructed to
ignore these differences. The task was to indicate by pressing a button
as quickly and accurately as possible whether the presented faces were
of the same or different races.
The results indicated that the more similar in luminance two faces
were, the longer it took to discriminate the faces by race. Yet,
importantly, reaction times were slowest not when two faces were ob-
jectively equiluminant, but when the Black face was a bit lighter than
the White face.
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2.5. Summary and Conclusion
Hence, it would seem that differences in facial form (White vs. Black
vs. ambiguous), lexical labeling (‘White’ vs. ‘Black’), and/or visual
context (ambiguous/White vs. ambiguous/Black) influence the judged
lightness of faces. That at least some portion of this influence is gen-
uinely perceptual is underscored by the finding that the discrimination
of faces by race is involuntarily sensitive to differences in the luminance
or lightness of those faces. Since the effect is apparently insensitive to
line-drawing color (light vs. dark), it does not seem to be mediated
by selectively attending to lighter/darker regions of White/Black faces.
These considerations jointly suggest that, indeed, “the relative associ-
ations between lightness and White faces and between darkness and
Black faces . . . make White and Black faces appear lighter and darker,
respectively, than they actually are” (Levin & Banaji 2006, p. 501).
Of course, one may still question whether the experimental results
reflect genuine perceptual effects. For example, recall that in the first
experiment, subjects judged White/Black faces as lighter/darker even
in the same-race trials. Yet in these trials, the reference and the match-
ing faces differed only in their initial luminance. However distorted a
subject may perceive the lightness of a reference face, one would ex-
pect that s/he perceives the lightness of a matching face with identical
form features as similarly distorted. So the distortions should cancel
out in the same-race trials, and subjects should adjust the luminance
of the matching face to roughly the same objective level as that of the
reference face. That this was not the case suggests that at least some
portion of the effect may be better explained by perceptual misjudg-
ments or response biases than genuine perceptual distortions (cf. the
“El Greco fallacy”; Firestone & Scholl 2014).
Levin and Banaji attempt to explain away the above finding in purely
perceptual terms. But we need not concern ourselves with their ac-
count. For even if their proposal is wrong, recall that the distortions
were greater in the different-race trials than in the same-race trials (first
experiment), and the effect was even greater when the matching stim-
ulus was a mere gray patch (second experiment). Further, it seems very
hard to explain on cognitive grounds why subjects would be slowest in
discriminating a pair of faces by race not when the faces are equilumi-
nant, but when the Black face is actually a bit lighter than the White
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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face (fourth experiment). Given these considerations, the results of the
same-race trials leave plenty of room for assuming that at least some
portion of the effect was perceptual.
Some may still worry that the results reflect stimulus or attentional
artifacts. For example, Machery (forthcoming) emphasizes that the
eyes of the prototypical White face were objectively darker than the
eyes of the prototypical Black face. This was needed to assure that the
average luminance of the faces were identical. But recall that the effect
was similar for evenly filled line-drawing faces, whether the lines were
light or dark (third experiment). So even if some portion of the effect
is contaminated by artifacts, perhaps another portion is not.
Note, though, that nothing ultimately hangs on the above points.
For the crux of my argument is that even if the face lightness illusion
is a genuine perceptual effect that is uncontaminated by artifacts, the
effect still doesn’t constitute a convincing case of cognitive penetration.
If it turns out that the effect is not genuinely perceptual and/or it is
mediated by artifacts, then so much the worse for a thesis of cognitive
penetration.
3. AN UNWARRANTED ARGUMENT
What makes Levin and Banaji’s findings so special? Note that it has long
been known that color judgments are distorted for color-diagnostic ob-
jects. For example, in a classic psychological study conducted by Delk
and Fillenbaum (1965), subjects judged orange-red cutout figures as
more red for red-associated figures (heart, apple, lips) than for other-
color-associated (horse, bell, mushroom) or non-color-associated fig-
ures (oval, circle, ellipse). Such results cohere with more recent evi-
dence according to which the subjective gray point of color-diagnostic
objects is generally shifted towards the complementary color of those
objects. For example, subjects set the gray point of an image of a typi-
cally blue object like a Nivea tin to what is objectively somewhat yellow,
and the gray point of an image of a typically yellow object like an UHU
glue to what is objectively somewhat blue (Witzel et al. 2011).
Some recent studies question whether such findings reflect genuine
perceptual phenomena (e.g., Gross et al. 2014, this volume). But as-
sume that they do. Still, even defendants of cognitive penetration typ-
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ically allow that such effects of perceptual learning may ultimately be
explained by non-cognitive factors. For example, as Macpherson notes,
It might be that the early visual system, autonomously from
belief or other cognitive states, alters the colour experi-
ences of characteristically red shapes, to make them ap-
pear more red than they really are. This might happen in
accordance with associationist principles, so that it is past
exposure to a certain shape having a certain colour that
has altered the way the visual system processes that shape’s
colour. (2012, p. 46)
Now distortions in the judged lightness of prototypical Black/White
faces seem to afford a similar explanation in terms of intra-visual shape-
color (or form-lightness) associations. Since such intra-visual associa-
tions are plausibly cognitively impenetrable, this would explain why
face discrimination by race is sensitive to differences in the luminance
of faces despite explicit instructions to disregard such differences (and
hence, why the face lightness illusion persists in the face of contrary
beliefs and desires). Accordingly, in themselves, these findings of Levin
and Banaji warrant no special attention.
Yet the finding that subjects judged the very same image of a racially
ambiguous face as relatively lighter when it was labeled ‘White’ as op-
posed to ‘Black’ strike some as especially revealing of cognitive pen-
etration. The apparent basis for this view is an unargued conviction
that “categorization was clearly done at the cognitive level as it was the
labelling of the face that was responsible for the effect” (Macpherson
2012, p. 48). Based on this reasoning, a rather straightforward argu-
ment for cognitive penetration seems to run as follows:
Argument from lexical labeling
(1) Distortions in the perceived lightness of ambiguous
faces were a function of lexical labeling.
(2) If the relevant distortions were a function of lexical la-
beling, then the effect was mediated by cognitive cat-
egorization.
(3) If the effect was mediated by cognitive categorization,
then low-level visual experience was cognitively pene-
trated.
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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Hence,
(4) Low-level visual experience was cognitively penetrated.
I claim that none of the assumptions of this argument are warranted,
and hence there is little reason to assume that low-level visual experi-
ence is cognitively penetrable. Here’s why.
3.1. Re (2): Lexical vs. Conceptual vs. Cognitive Effects
Let us first consider premise (2), according to which a labeling effect
entails a cognitive effect. Why assume this? The premise seems to rely
on the following (hidden) assumptions:
(2a) If the effect was lexically mediated, then it was con-
ceptually mediated.
(2b) If the effect was conceptually mediated, then it was
cognitively mediated.
Yet these assumptions are hardly a matter of course. On the contrary,
there may be various reasons to question both. In the following two
subsections, I provide some considerations accordingly.
3.1.1. Re (2a): Lexical-Visual Associations
In a classical experiment by Swinney (1979), subjects heard sentences
that contained a semantically ambiguous word, such as:
Rumor had it that, for years, the government building had
been plagued with problems. The man was not surprised
when he found several spiders, roaches, and other bugs in
the corner of his room.
Simultaneously with the ambiguous word ‘bug’ — which can mean ei-
ther insect or surveillance device — subjects were visually presented
with a letter string. Their task was to decide as quickly as possible
whether the letter string was a word or a non-word. As expected, lexi-
cal decisions were facilitated (only) for related words. Yet, importantly,
this facilitation occurred irrespective of whether the related word was
contextually relevant (‘ant’) or contextually inappropriate (‘spy’).
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Such findings suggest that, at least in some cases, the effects of sen-
tence context on lexical access do not have so much to do with seman-
tic processing per se. Rather, the effects may be mediated by certain
intra-modular associations between mere lexical forms stored in a pro-
prietary database of a language module (Fodor 1983)). This coheres
with Collins and Loftus’s (1975) spreading-activation theory of seman-
tic processing, according to which the names of concepts (words) are
stored in a lexical network (dictionary) that is separate from — albeit
connected with — a semantic network of concepts.
Now the hypothesis of intra-modular/inter-lexical associations is
easily extended to inter-modular/cross-modal associations. Accordingly,
it is at least an empirical possibility that the lightness distortion ef-
fect for ambiguous faces was mediated by certain infra-cognitive as-
sociations between lexical items like ‘black’ and ‘white’ stored in a lan-
guage module, and some corresponding color representations (of, e.g.,
black and white) stored in a visual module. Associations of such a
kind might imply some degree of cross-penetrability between modu-
lar systems. But, importantly, these systems may still be encapsulated
from cognition at large. This coheres with evidence that cross-modal
effects like the “McGurk effect” — whereby visual exposure to the lip
movements of a speaker influences the perception of concurrent speech
sounds (McGurk & MacDonald 1976) — are themselves undergirded by
cognitively impenetrable processes (Fodor 1983, 1988; Pylyshyn 2003).
Note that I am not arguing that the above proposal in particular is
correct. Indeed, I will later argue that the distortion effect for ambigu-
ous faces was most likely not lexically mediated. Neither is my point
that the relevant perceptual distortions were not conceptually medi-
ated. My issue is specifically with the conditional according to which
if the ambiguous-face lightness illusion was lexically mediated, then it
follows that the effect was conceptually mediated.
Hence, my reason for referencing the above proposals is mainly to
underscore that, contra (2a), there are various empirical and theoretical
considerations on the basis of which one may wish to be cautious in
inferring a conceptual effect from a lexical effect. This is a dialectically
important point, for the burden of my present argumentation is to show
that none of the (hidden) premises of the argument from labeling are as
firmly grounded as proponents of the argument would have us believe.
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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Examples like those of Swinney, Fodor, Collins and Loftus, or McGurk
and MacDonald provide at least some reasons for resisting (2a). But
not much ultimately hangs on this, as I will presently argue that (2b)
is itself unjustified.
3.1.2. Re (2b): Non-Cognitive Concepts
According to (2b), if the relevant effect was conceptually mediated,
then it follows that it was cognitively mediated. If this claim is analytic,
then so be it. But it strikes me as far from clear that the claim is justified
on a substantive reading.
For example, consider the original dialectic of the cognitive-
penetration debate. The cognitive revolution in psychology led to a
widespread belief that, as opposed to earlier theorizing, even rela-
tively low-level perceptual processes are by and large inferentially me-
diated (within the usual limitations of the metaphor). Inferences need
premises, and at the time, it seemed natural to many that these premises
must be represented in the mind by sentence-like representations the
constituents of which are concepts (Fodor 1975, 2008).
Traditional proponents of cognitive impenetrability accepted this
view. What they vehemently denied is that it follows from the infer-
ential nature of a mental process that it is also informationally promis-
cuous and hence cognitively penetrable (Fodor 1985; Pylyshyn 1984).
Accordingly, proponents of impenetrability may allow that perceptual
processes are by and large conceptually mediated, yet still deny that
these processes are by and large cognitively influenced.
With that said, it is important to keep in mind that the issue of
whether conceptual mediation entails cognitive mediation is orthogo-
nal to the issue of whether perception is cognitively penetrable. For ex-
ample, albeit a staunch defender of cognitive impenetrability, Raftopou-
los (2012) agrees that there is a mutual entailment relation between
concepthood and cognitive penetrability. On the other hand, whereas
Toribio (2014) seems neutral about cognitive penetrability, she argues
that the mutual entailment thesis is true only if it is trivial, or if it com-
pletely fails to engage with the contemporary literature on perceptual
nonconceptualism. I will certainly not resolve this issue here. My point
is merely that, given such considerations and controversies, it is hardly
a matter of course that one may infer a cognitive effect on the basis of
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a conceptual effect.
Of course, a defender of cognitive penetration may still hold that
such an inference is warranted in the particular case of the ambiguous-
face illusion. For example, s/he might note that even if we allow for
the existence of non-cognitive concepts, surely, concepts of race are
still cognitive. Perhaps so; but nothing follows from this. For notice
that the labels used by Levin and Banaji (‘Black’ and ‘White’) are am-
biguous between color terms and race terms. So even if distortions in
the perceived lightness of ambiguous faces were a function of lexical
labeling, it would still be an open empirical possibility that the effect
was mediated by non-cognitive concepts.
Indeed, “psychophysical” concepts of color are prime candidates of
non-cognitive concepts that are available for tokening by cognitively
impenetrable perceptual systems (Fodor 1987). So a skeptic of cogni-
tive penetration may well grant that the relevant effect was mediated by
low-level color concepts like BLACK or WHITE. Contra (2b), it is unclear
why it would follow that the effects of these color concepts were in turn
mediated by high-level cognitive race concepts like AFRICAN-AMERICAN
or CAUCASIAN, respectively.
An anonymous referee noted that even if the above scenario is an
empirically real possibility, it is still abductively more plausible, all things
considered, that the ambiguous face lightness illusion was cognitively
mediated. I disagree — but more on that later. The relevant reply is
that I am here not concerned with whether the consequent of (2b) —
the claim that there was a cognitive effect — is abductively plausible.
The target of this subsection is the very conditional according to which
a conceptual effect entails a cognitive effect. It is this claim, I have
argued, that there is plenty of room to resist.
3.2. Re (3): Cognitive Priming vs. Cognitive Penetration
So far, I have provided some reasons to resist taking it for granted
that the assumed labeling effect was conceptually (2a) and hence cog-
nitively mediated (2b). Accordingly, it would seem that the second
premise (2) of the argument from labeling is at least more question-
able than defenders of cognitive penetration suggest. Of course, this
still leaves open the possibility that the ambiguous-face lightness illu-
sion was, as a matter of empirical fact, cognitively mediated. According
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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to premise (3), it would then follow that low-level visual experience was
cognitively penetrated. Is there reason to question this claim? I argue
that indeed there is.
3.2.1. Semantic/Logical Coherence
It is significant that the face lightness illusion for prototypical faces per-
sists even if one knows that the faces are objectively equiluminant. Both
Levin and Banaji, and Macpherson emphasize this. This is somewhat
ironical given that the persistence of an illusion in the face of contrary
beliefs is traditionally considered strong prima facie evidence that the
very states or processes underserving the illusion are cognitively impen-
etrable.
Beliefs and similar attitudes are paradigmatically cognitively pene-
trable. So the persistence of the face lightness illusion strongly suggests
that whatever states or processes underlie the face lightness illusion, be-
liefs and similar attitudes are not among them. Macpherson suggests
accordingly that perhaps the illusion is not mediated by beliefs, but by
merely primed cognitive concepts. But this suggestion cannot satisfy
the condition of sustaining some semantic or logical coherence between
the contents of cognition and the contents of perception. For priming
is a reflex-like, non-inferential process, that is notoriously insensitive to
the compositional semantics of syntactically structured representations
in general, and logical operators in particular. Let me explain.
For example, consider an experiment in which subjects first watched
as an experimenter poured sugar from a single source into two separate
clean bottles. After this, the experimenter asked the subjects to place
a label reading “not sodium cyanide, not poison” on a bottle of their
choice, and a label reading “sucrose, table sugar” on the other bottle.
Amazingly, subjects still rated drinks sweetened with sugar from the
bottle labeled “not sodium cyanide, not poison” as less desirable, and
they were also more reluctant to take a sip from these drinks (Rozin
et al. 1990). This coheres with evidence on “negative suggestions” in
hypnosis and advertising, whereby a person to whom it is suggested
not to think or feel or do something, is as a result more likely to think
or feel or do that thing, respectively (cf., e.g., Cyna & Lang 2010).
So, then, say a subject is shown an ambiguous face labeled ‘White,’
whereas another subject is shown the same face labeled ‘not White.’
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Will the two subjects perceive the face differently? The priming account
predicts that the answer is no. The labels are expected to exert an
identical effect (if any) on perception, in virtue of an identical priming
of some concept corresponding to WHITE.
Now even on Macpherson’s account, “perceptual experience is cog-
nitively impenetrable if it is not possible for two subjects . . . to have
two different experiences on account of a difference in their cognitive
systems” (2012, p. 29). In our example, one subject believes that the
ambiguous face is White, and hence only tokens WHITE. The other
subject believes that the face is non-White, and hence also tokens NOT
WHITE. These are logically contradictory beliefs, with correspondingly
different concepts employed. If the priming account predicts that such
differences have no bearing on perceptual experience, then the account
would not seem to satisfy the condition of semantic/logical coherence.
Hence, contra (3), the mere influence of some cognitive category does
not entail cognitive penetration.
3.2.2. “Weak” Cognitive Penetration
Granted, it would still be extremely interesting if one’s beliefs could in-
directly influence perceptual experience via the automatic priming of
cognitive concepts. Accordingly, a defender of cognitive penetration
may perhaps simply drop or at least modify the semantic/logical condi-
tion in such a way as to allow for cognitive priming effects. This would
result in a weaker thesis of cognitive penetration than is of interest
here. All the same, I don’t think there are good reasons to assume that
low-level visual experience is even “weakly” cognitively penetrable.
For example, say I believe that a grayscale image of a face I am
presented depicts a Chinese person. As it happens, I associate China
with Communism, and Communism with the color red. Thus, when
my concept CHINESE is primed, RED is correspondingly primed. Will I
then perceive the face as somewhat red?
That the very question seems absurd suggests that whatever pro-
cesses underlie the face lightness distortion effect, those processes are
stimulus-triggered and modality-specific. In turn, this suggests that the
effect is not mediated by relatively abstract concepts like those of race.
I will soon argue accordingly that the effect is more plausibly mediated
by relatively low-level perceptual representations of shape (facial form)
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and color (lightness).
Yet one may perhaps object that my example is misleading be-
cause, as opposed to color associates of race, color associates of po-
litical/socioeconomic systems or ideologies are irrelevant to perceiv-
ing the lightness of a face. Indeed they are. But how could the pro-
cesses that mediate priming take this into account? In particular, how
could reflex-like, non-inferential processes that are insensitive to struc-
tured/composed representations and rationality constraints like seman-
tic/logical coherence assess for and selectively prime concepts based on
relevance?
Alternatively, a proponent may object that no one actually holds that
it is primed concepts per se that penetrate perceptual experience. Per-
haps the assumption is that priming can influence the level or threshold
of activation of concepts that uncontroversially contribute to experience
when activated. For example, perhaps the priming of a race concept like
AFRICAN-AMERICAN influences visual experience by enhancing the acti-
vation level of a color concept like BLACK. But, the objection might
go, whereas it is independently plausible that BLACK is activated by a
grayscale image of a racially ambiguous face, there is little correspond-
ing reason to assume that a grayscale image of a Chinese face leads to a
stimulus-dependent activation of RED. So even if RED is primed by COM-
MUNISM upon exposure to a Chinese face, insofar as RED is only primed
and not eventually activated, proponents of the priming account need
not assume that the face is perceived as somewhat red.
But say the Chinese face is depicted not in grayscale, but in orange-
red color, like the cutout figures of Delk and Fillenbaum. If it is plausible
that grayscale images can elicit stimulus-dependent activation of color
concepts like BLACK or WHITE, then it seems correspondingly plausi-
ble that orange-red images may elicit stimulus-dependent activation of
color concepts like ORANGE or RED. And if it is plausible that the prim-
ing of AFRICAN-AMERICAN can influence visual experience via a modifi-
cation of the actual activation level of BLACK, then it should seem cor-
respondingly plausible that the priming of COMMUNISM may influence
visual experience via a modification of the activation level of RED.
I know of no empirical study to date that rules out the above possi-
bility per se. But I doubt anyone would hold their breath. If perceptual
experience were really so thoroughly penetrable as the priming account
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suggests, then it would be simply a mystery how, after nearly seven
decades of research starting with Bruner & Goodman (1947), defend-
ers of cognitive penetration still haven’t provided a more convincing
empirical demonstration than the Levin and Banaji effect (cf. Firestone
& Scholl forthcoming; Machery forthcoming).
Hence, even if not conclusive, considerations of the above kind at
least raise serious doubts about the empirical plausibility of “weak” cog-
nitive penetration. In turn, this provides further reason to question the
antecedent of premise (3), according to which the face lightness illusion
was mediated by cognitive categories. In the previous subsection, I al-
ready noted that the illusion is unlikely to be undergirded by belief-like
cognitive states. As we have now seen, the idea of conceptual pene-
tration via cognitive priming is no more plausible. So my worry is not
merely that we may lack good reason to assume that the relevant effect
was cognitive (∼assume C). If my analysis is correct, there is also con-
siderable reason to assume outright that this was in fact not the case
(assume ∼C).
Note that, as opposed to the truth-functional account of material im-
plication, there is broad consensus that it doesn’t follow from a false an-
tecedent that an indicative conditional regarding some empirical matter
is true. So reasons to doubt the antecedent of (3) hardly translate to
reasons to assume that the conditional as such (cognitive categoriza-
tion ⊃ cognitive penetration) is true. Indeed, I already argued that the
conditional is at best false on a standard understanding of cognitive
penetration. On a weaker understanding, the claim may be either true
or false, or simply lacking in truth value. Given these contingencies and
the relative implausibility of the priming account, (3) could hardly be
further from trivial.
3.3. Re (1): Lexical Labeling vs. Visual Context
The above considerations notwithstanding, some may argue that a cog-
nitive account of the ambiguous-face illusion is still abductively more
plausible if the effect was indeed mediated by lexical labeling. So was
it? Defenders of cognitive penetration seem to take it for granted that it
was.3 Premise (1) states as much. Yet a careful consideration of Levin
and Banaji’s experimental design provides plenty of space for doubt.
Recall that in the crucial (second) experiment, faces were only la-
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beled during the instruction phase, at which point an ambiguous face
always appeared next to an unambiguous Black or White face. After
instructions, all faces were presented without labels and on their own.
So whenever a face was labeled, it appeared in the visual context of an-
other face; and whenever a face was unlabeled, it appeared on its own.
In technical terms, this means that the factor of lexical labeling was
confounded with the factor of visual context. This is quite a method-
ological flaw if the authors’ intention was to test for the effects of lexical
labeling.
Now Levin and Banaji advertise in their abstract that judgments of
lightness were distorted “even for racially ambiguous faces that were
disambiguated by labels” (501). This suggests (albeit it doesn’t imply)
that the crucial effect was indeed lexically mediated. Yet the authors
are themselves more cautious when they claim in a later section of their
paper that the ambiguous faces were differentiated “on the basis of their
context and/or a label” (510; emphasis added). Indeed, one of the
authors has noted in personal e-mail correspondence that s/he “would
be surprised if the absence of a label had much of an effect.” These
remarks suggest that the effect may have been mediated (exclusively)
by visual context.
Hence, for all we know, the relevant perceptual effect might be pre-
served if ambiguous faces are presented without labels in the context of
unambiguous faces (no labels / visual context). On the other hand, it
is a real empirical possibility that the effect would disappear if labeled
ambiguous faces were presented on their own (labels / no visual con-
text). These possibilities suggest not only that the effect may not have
been mediated by labeling alone. More importantly, they suggest that
the labels may have had nothing to do with the effect.
So, it would seem that not even the very starting premise (1) of
the argument from labeling enjoys the support that one would have
expected. That the mentioned design flaw has so far gone unnoticed
is especially surprising given that the labeling effect is widely consid-
ered to be the prima facie most convincing piece of evidence in favor
of cognitive penetration. Considering this oversight, it is really unclear
whether the argument from labeling has enough wind left to convince
any skeptics.
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4. A TENTATIVE ACCOUNT OF THE PHENOMENA
So far, I have provided various reasons to doubt that the ambiguous-
face lightness illusion is an example of cognitive penetration. In the
last section, I noted in particular that given the design of the relevant
experiment, it is a real empirical possibility that whereas a lexical label
is neither necessary nor sufficient, a visual context of an unambiguous
face is both necessary and sufficient for the effect to occur for ambigu-
ous faces. How could this be so? In this section, I provide a sketch of a
positive account.
4.1. Form-Lightness Associations
Firstly, consider that the primary visual diagnostic feature of race is
facial form. For example, Black faces tend to have thicker lips and a
wider nose than White faces, and the features of racially mixed or am-
biguous faces are typically somewhere in between. Correspondingly,
Black faces tend to have darker skin tone than White faces, and the
skin tone of racially mixed or ambiguous faces is typically somewhere
in between. So why assume that the face lightness illusion is medi-
ated by extra-perceptual categories of race? A much simpler and more
plausible assumption is that the effect is mediated by intra-perceptual
associations between facial form and color/lightness.
Despite their earlier remarks and suggestions to the contrary, Levin
and Banaji turn out to argue exactly along these lines:
This distortion might be considered a case where a set of
correlated features mutually facilitate each other such that
the presence of most members of the set causes activation
of representations of the missing members. So, the corre-
lation between form and shading causes shading features
to be activated in the presence of form features. . . . Thus,
Black faces might appear relatively dark. . . as the result of
feature activations resulting from a perceptual classification.
(511; emphasis added)
This assumption coheres well with evidence on the “memory color
effect,” of which the face lightness illusion is ultimately just a special
case. The effect involves a modulation by memory colors of the per-
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ceived color of subjectively color-diagnostic objects. For example, re-
call that subjects seem to perceive a heart shape as more red (Delk &
Fillenbaum 1965), or a Nivea tin as more blue (Witzel et al. 2011),
than similarly colored objects of which these colors are not diagnos-
tic. Though these effects seem to be object-sensitive, they are also ap-
parently experience-driven, modality-specific, and thought-insensitive.
The latter features militate against the idea that the memory color effect
is cognitively mediated (Deroy 2013).
The Witzel et al. study is instructive in this sense. The authors only
used images of objects that met pre-set criteria of high subjective color
diagnosticity, as measured by reaction time and accuracy of identifying
the typical color of an object. Yet out of the 14 images used, only 10
elicited a relevant observable effect; for only 7 images was the effect
statistically significant; and even among these cases, there was great
variation in the magnitude of the effect.
Even more importantly, the direction of the effect was effectively
reversed for some images. In general, the subjective gray point of an
object shifted toward the complementary color of the color associated
with that object; e.g., toward yellow for a typically blue object like a
Nivea tin. One would thus expect that the subjective gray point of typ-
ically red objects shifts toward green. Yet this was not the case. For
red-associated objects like a heart shape or a Coke bottle, the subjec-
tive gray point shifted toward the associated color, i.e., red.
It is very hard to think of a plausible explanation as to why cognition
would penetrate perception in such diverse and unexpected ways. On
the other hand, a further finding that shifts in subjective gray point were
particularly large for objects the typical colors of which are close to the
daylight axis — an axis that passes from the bluish to the yellowish part
of the color space — only underscores that, rather than the influence
of cognition, these effects reflect built-in constraints of our perceptual
system.
So there is good reason to assume that the associations between
shape and color/lightness on which the memory color effect depends
are intra-perceptually mediated. That the Levin and Banaji effect in
particular is undergirded by intra-perceptual associations is further sup-
ported by a fresh study in which images of the prototypical White and
Black faces were blurred to the extent that most subjects could not tell
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the race of the faces. All the same, these subjects also judged the White
face as relatively lighter than the Black face (Firestone & Scholl forth-
coming). Though this finding does not rule out that perhaps race con-
cepts were still unconsciously tokened or primed, it does provide fur-
ther reason to question whether the cognitive-penetration account is all
that plausible.
4.2. Lightness Contrast
The hypothesis of intra-perceptual form-lightness associations thus pre-
dicts a memory color effect whereby White faces are perceived as lighter
than equiluminant Black faces, and the lightness of ambiguous faces is
perceived as being somewhere in between. If this hypothesis is cor-
rect, then presenting an ambiguous face next to a Black or White face
is like presenting a shade of gray next to a shade of black or white,
respectively. Yet it is a classic textbook example of lightness contrast
that the very same shade of gray looks lighter/darker in the context of
a black/white shade! So given a genuine memory color effect for faces,
it should not be that surprising if the lightness of an ambiguous face is
perceived differently in the context of a Black and a White face.
Note that perceptual contrast effects are a function of the perceived
(subjective) and not the actual (objective) reflective properties of the
stimuli. So it is a non-issue that the ambiguous and unambiguous faces
were objectively identical in luminance. Nor is it an issue that, after
instructions, in the trials in which subjects actually judged for lightness,
the faces were presented one at a time. For anchoring effects due to
simultaneous contrast in the instruction phase might have easily carried
over to the first trial. After that, perceptual anchoring and adaptation
might both explain successive (between-trial) contrast effects.
Hence, I propose that differences in the judged lightness of ambigu-
ous faces had not so much to do with lexical labeling or racial dis-
ambiguation, as with lightness contrast mediated by intra-perceptual
form-lightness associations. This hypothesis makes sense of various
findings that would be very hard to explain on cognitive terms. For ex-
ample, it tends to go without mention that in the labeling experiment,
lightness judgments were only distorted for the apparently lighter face
among an ambiguous/unambiguous face pair, and hence the distortions
only tended toward over-lightening. So if an ambiguous ‘White’ face
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was paired with an unambiguous Black face, the ambiguous face was
judged as relatively lighter, whereas the unambiguous face was cor-
rectly judged. Yet if an ambiguous ‘Black’ face was paired with an un-
ambiguous White face, the ambiguous face was correctly judged, and
it was the unambiguous face that was judged as relatively lighter.
My proposal can easily account for this apparent anomaly. For ex-
ample, lightness contrast may have led to an application by the percep-
tual system of a highest-luminance rule (Adelson 2000; Gilchrist et al.
1999), whereby the apparently lighter face was anchored to white. Of
course, not much hangs on whether this is the actual rule or mechanism
underlying the effect. The important point is that insofar as the rele-
vant distortions are biased in such unexpected albeit consistent ways,
an intra-perceptual account of the phenomena is indeed much simpler
and more plausible than a cognitive account.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The conclusion of this paper is that the Levin and Banaji effect is an un-
convincing case of cognitive penetration. While a prima facie powerful
argument suggests the contrary based on the assumption that differen-
tial lightness judgments for ambiguous faces were a function of lexical
labeling, on closer scrutiny, it turns out that the premises of this ar-
gument are neither empirically nor theoretically very well supported.
Accordingly, I argued that the phenomena are more easily and plausibly
explained by intra-perceptual than by cognitive mechanisms.
My account is clearly more parsimonious than a cognitive account,
for it does not assume the involvement of any lexical or cognitive rep-
resentations. It is also empirically more plausible insofar as it does not
posit any as-of-yet unestablished or controversial psychological mech-
anisms. And it is abductively preferable insofar as it can explain ev-
erything that a cognitive account can, and also more. For example, my
proposal can easily account for why the face lightness illusion persists
in the face of contrary beliefs, or why the effect was selective and uni-
directional in the ambiguous-face experiment.
The upshot is that memory color effects like the face lightness dis-
tortion effect might be sufficiently explained by the internal workings
of cognitively impenetrable perceptual systems. This suggests that
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perceptual systems are more plastic and hence psychologically richer
than is commonly assumed. Importantly, and contrary to a currently
widespread view in philosophy, it also suggests that the significance of
cognitively impenetrable systems is not confined to a subpersonal or
unconscious level.
For example, consider the epistemic threat posed by cognitive pen-
etration with respect to the role of perception in justification. If our
beliefs can penetrate our perceptual experience, which we in turn con-
sider as evidence for our beliefs, then the structure of belief formation
would seem to be circular (Siegel 2011). If my proposal is correct,
and perceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable, then this worry
might be overcome.
It bears emphasis that not all accounts of cognitive impenetrability
circumvent the threat of circularity. For example, a common strategy
of explaining away alleged effects of cognitive penetration is in terms
of perceptual misjudgment. One might thus maintain that perceptual
experience remains intact in the face of cognitive biases in judgment.
But if a subject is genuinely deluded about his or her perceptual expe-
rience, then, akin to the case of cognitive penetration, she might just as
well consider her mistaken judgments as evidence for beliefs that were
the source of the bias in the first place.
An apparent further advantage of my account, then, is that it can
circumvent the epistemic threat of circularity without the undesirable
implication that we are possibly way more often deluded about our first-
person phenomenal experiences than epistemologists and psychologists
would have it (not to mention regular folk). Of course, if my proposal
is correct, we might still often be victims of perceptual illusions. So
certain epistemic worries remain. But at least these are not the worries
of circular belief formation or introspective bias.
Now one may wonder whether or how my analysis extends beyond,
for example, those of Deroy (2013) or Firestone & Scholl (forthcom-
ing). Deroy provides a thorough analysis of the memory color effect,
but she doesn’t address the Levin and Banaji effect. Firestone and Scholl
address the effect head on, but only for prototypical White/Black faces.
As I noted earlier, most defenders of cognitive penetration are in
principle prepared to grant that standard memory color effects (e.g.
that hearts are perceived as more red) are intra-perceptually medi-
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ated. These defenders may be correspondingly ready to grant that the
face lightness illusion for prototypical White/Black faces affords a non-
cognitive explanation. Yet these defenders still argue that the illusion
for ambiguous faces cannot be so explained. To the best of my knowl-
edge, I am the first to expose the weaknesses of this argumentation, as
I am also the first to offer a plausible low-level account of the crucial
evidence.
Of course, debunking evidence or arguments that defenders don’t
find crucial is still important progress. But it is unlikely to make serious
headway in the overall debate. So an evident dialectic advantage of
my analysis is that it specifically addresses what many defenders them-
selves pinpoint as the most convincing case for cognitive penetration.
Given this dialectic, my challenge cannot be swept aside by noting that
I have merely cast doubt on a single case. Hence, if my analysis of the
relevant evidence and the argument that builds on it is more or less
correct, the burden is indeed on defenders to argue why anyone should
still assume that low-level visual experience is cognitively penetrable.
Notes
1For more liberal views on attention-mediated effects, see Macpherson (2012) or Prinz
(2006).
2As opposed to the between-subjects design of the second experiment, though, the
third experiment had a within-subjects design. So all subjects completed trials both for
when the ambiguous face initially appeared next to an unambiguous White face, and for
when the ambiguous face initially appeared next to an unambiguous Black face. Unfor-
tunately, Levin and Banaji do not mention whether they used labels in this experiment.
3For example, Macpherson describes the crucial (second) experiment as follows: “a
racially ambiguous face was labelled either as the face of a white person or the face of a
black person and this factor alone determined what shade of grey the subjects chose as a
match for the lightness of the face” (2012, p. 48).
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